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Abstract 
As part of a programme of research that is developing tools to enhance choreographic 
practice, an interdisciplinary team of cognitive scientists, neuroscientists and dance 
professionals collaborated on two studies examining the mental representations used to 
support movement creation. We studied choreographer Wayne McGregor’s approach to 
movement creation through tasking, in which he asks dancers to create movement in response 
to task instructions that require a great deal of mental imagery and decision making.  
In our first experiment, we used experience sampling methods (self-report scales and 
reports about the current focus of thought) with the full company of Wayne McGregor | 
Random Dance to describe what the dancers report thinking about while creating movement, 
and to establish how their experiences change as a function of different task conditions. In 
particular, we contrasted a conventional ‘active’ condition (where dancers are free to move 
around) with a ‘static’ condition (where they have to create movement mentally, without 
moving), because all neuroimaging studies of dance require participants to lie motionless 
within a scanner. We adapted the static mode from Experiment 1 for the neuroimaging 
session in Experiment 2. Here we recorded the brain activity of an experienced dancer from 
Wayne McGregor | Random Dance while she mentally undertook movement creation tasks 
similar to those used in our experience sampling experiment. Both studies involved imagery 
tasks of a primarily spatial-praxic nature (involving an imagined object or volume that could 
be approached and manipulated) and imagery that focused on content invoking emotional 
narratives. 
In the first study, the dancers’ awareness was focused more than they had anticipated 
upon conceptual rather than physical or bodily aspects. The very act of reflecting on, and 
categorising, their experiences provided the dancers with insights about their mental habits 
during innovative movement creation. Such insights provide conditions under which habits 
can be recognised and then altered to adopt alternative points in mental space from which to 
create movement material. Providing the dancers and McGregor with a means to 
communicate more productively about the properties of the task-based instructions has been 
acknowledged by the company to be of clear benefit and a useful addition to their working 
process. 
In the second study we assessed the feasibility of using fMRI to study the neural 
underpinnings of choreographing movement tasks. The experiment enabled us to compare 
brain activity in imagery and movement creation.  The data raise some key questions 
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concerning the mental context in which such thinking occurs and, given the clear limitations 
of the current fMRI and experience sampling work, how future research might usefully be 
directed. 
Taken together, these two exploratory studies indicate that the experiential and neural 
attributes of imagery during movement creation are open to systematic investigation: 
innovative movement creation can start from alternative points in mental, as well as physical, 
space. This enables us to look forward to establishing with greater precision how tasks that 
challenge dancers in different ways may affect mental and neural processes and how variation 
in imagery use across dancers might contribute to the variety of movement creation that they 
produce. Notably, the act of reflecting on the experience of movement creation also offers 
some practical leverage to help dancers develop a wider range of strategies for innovation. 
These findings are being used to contribute to further work informing the development of 
personal, notebook-like, Choreographic Thinking Tools. 
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Introduction 
Several renowned choreographers, such as Trisha Brown, William Forsythe, Wayne 
McGregor and Merce Cunningham have explored their performers’ expressive range through 
developing and refining techniques for generating and structuring novel forms of movement. 
This paper focuses on the mental strategies underpinning the movement innovation 
techniques used by one of these choreographers, Wayne McGregor and his company Wayne 
McGregor | Random Dance.  In particular, we want to understand how different forms of 
mental imagery are involved in movement creation, and how different task constraints can 
change the nature of the imagery that is used. We are also concerned with the ecological 
validity of neuroimaging studies of choreography in which participants must necessarily lie 
still in a scanner, whereas movement creation typically combines mental and physical 
activity. 
Wayne McGregor’s approach to movement creation involves dancers making a wide 
range of embodied mental transformations. He asks his dancers to create movement in 
response to task instructions that require a great deal of mental imagery and decision making, 
and then observes the dancers’ resulting movement, selecting and amplifying sections for 
potential re-use. It is this process of movement creation in response to different forms of task 
instruction that our collaborative studies have set out to better understand. Comparative 
literature scholar Carrie Noland in her essay on the creative process of choreographer Merce 
Cunningham, invites her readers to consider “choreography not as an aesthetic practice, but as 
the production of puzzles for the body to solve, puzzles that require it to cope, to enact its 
kinesthetic and proprioceptive capacities, in unusual and taxing conditions” (Noland, 2009). 
Our paper parallels Noland’s analysis of Cunningham: we focus on the working practices of a 
single choreographer, Wayne McGregor, who also adopts a problem-solving approach to 
movement creation. Where Noland departs from the framework of dance scholarship to 
explore the techniques involved in Cunningham’s process using ideas from anthropology and 
cognitive science, we use the methods and conceptual framework of behavioural science, 
cognitive science and neuropsychology to address the underpinnings of McGregor’s 
innovative movement creation.  
In common usage, mental imagery is often understood as mainly visual in nature, but 
we are all able to construct mental imagery in other sensory domains: imagining sounds, 
textures, tastes and smells. We can imagine movement, without actually executing it, and it 
would be expected that dancers would be especially well practiced at this form of mental 
Points in Mental Space  6 
imagery. Alongside sensory imagery, we can also construct more abstract mental 
representations, including emotional feelings, and highly conceptual thoughts. In our research, 
we seek to understand how all of these forms of mental imagery are used to support 
movement creation. 
Mental imagery of all these forms pervades the content of the problems and tasks 
McGregor gives his dancers, and they approach both imagery and movement creation in the 
same underlying spirit of problem-solving as Cunningham (see Kirsh et al. 2009, for a 
summary of McGregor’s methods).  However, unlike Cunningham’s approach, McGregor’s 
challenge to his dancers is that they focus their attention on specific aspects of a mental image 
or images provided in the context of the problem or task. In executing the task the dancers are 
engaging in a process of movement creation in some direct correspondence to the stimuli the 
task sets out. Here is one example of a McGregor task: 
‘First thing to do is in your mind create a very simple, literal freehand sketch or 
drawing – in your mind. Choose a beginning on that sketch and then describe it 
physically or draw it – the whole thing rather than just an element of the whole 
thing. So it has duration. The third part of this is to discard the geometry (of the 
object that you drew) and replace that with colour. Then do another one.’ 
This task clearly requires a lot of mental work, some obvious and some not so obvious. 
It involves imagining and holding in focus a geometric spatial image that does not actually 
exist in space, and has to be internally generated. The instruction to “describe or draw it” is a 
suggestion of the action (with no further directions), and the direction to replace it with colour 
implies a transformation in meaning or emotional connotation – which the dancer is invited to 
assimilate into their movement solution. This is a relatively simple task for McGregor to ask 
the dancers to do – but it still requires a number of unusual decisions to be made. It was also a 
task that was invented for the purpose of conducting the data collection for the first 
experiment reported on in this paper. Under normal creation conditions tasks are derived from 
the space of conceptual inspiration McGregor is working in for a particular choreography. 
Other choreographers have developed methods for directly engaging the embodied 
mind of the dancer. William Forsythe’s Improvisation Technologies (see Forsythe 1999) were 
described by Dana Caspersen, a performer with Forsythe, as “tools for the playful mind, not 
laws or some kind of choreographic machinery” (Caspersen, 2007). Such tools are “useful in 
that they tend to promote an inventive curiosity” and encourage “the dancer’s mind to 
consider the vast number of states and organisations that the human body has to offer.” These 
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tools are doing the same thing that McGreogor’s tasks seek to do. Another example of this 
form of choreographic practice is Trisha Brown’s 1975 work Locus, in which the dancer 
“envisions the space around the body as a cube defining the choreography’s architecture” 
(Brown and Rosenberg, 2009) as a means of generating new movements.  
While movement creation is of strong interest to the choreographers so far mentioned, 
the use of other forms of mental imagery related to sensation, space, meaning and emotion is 
also widespread. This wider usage of imagery has been inferred from informal interviews 
with choreographers (e.g. Butterworth & Clarke 1998) and can also be found in reports of 
many specific practices used in the dance community, particularly in the field of somatics 
(e.g. the Skinner Releasing Technique, Anderson 2006) and in scientific studies of the use of 
mental imagery in dance (e.g. Jola & Mast, 2005). It is important to note that we are not 
discussing the question of whether task-based creation produces more aesthetically relevant 
material. We simply seek to describe the components of a part of McGregor’s creation 
process and to provide some systematic evidence on the use of imagery in dance and 
movement creation. The intention of our research is to record dancers’ awareness of their use 
of these forms of imagery during movement creation, and to relate these measures to evidence 
of patterns of brain activity from neuroimaging studies. 
In our first experiment, we used experience sampling methods with the full company of 
Wayne McGregor | Random Dance to describe what the dancers report thinking about while 
creating movement, how the dancers vary one from another, and to establish how their 
experiences change as a function of different task conditions. In particular, we contrast a 
conventional ‘active’ condition (where dancers are free to move around) with a ‘static’ 
condition (where they have to create movement mentally, without moving), because all 
neuroimaging studies require participants to lie motionless within a scanner: this is an obvious 
problem for neuroscientific studies of behaviours that usually involve movement, such as 
dance. To date, we do not know how the position and activity of the participant in 
neuroimaging studies affects the mental processes and neural activity involved in movement 
creation. 
In our second experiment, we recorded the brain activity of an experienced dancer from 
Wayne McGregor | Random Dance while mentally undertaking movement creation tasks 
similar to those used in our experience sampling experiment to open up debate concerning the 
extent to which fMRI data might act as a useful source of validation for otherwise purely 
subjective reports. Both studies involved imagery tasks of a primarily spatial-praxic nature 
(meaning an imagined object or volume that could be approached and manipulated) and 
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imagery that focuses on content invoking emotion and socio-personal narratives. 
This is our most ambitious attempt to date to fully report on the interdisciplinary 
research work that straddles the disciplines of dance and science, bringing together authors 
from different research backgrounds. The background theory to this study can be found in the 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model of cognition (e.g., Barnard 1985; Barnard et al., 
2007), especially the specific ideas about different forms of mental representation or imagery.  
Unlike Noland’s third-person observations of Cunningham, we interact directly with 
McGregor and the dancers as participants in experiments designed to help us (as scientists) 
and them (as dance practitioners) better understand innovative movement creation. Our goal 
is to develop tools that will enhance the practice of choreography by bringing scientific 
findings back to the studio in ways that can be used by McGregor and his dancers. This paper 
describes some of the scientific methods and results that have informed the initial 
development of some prototype tools and processes currently referred to in the studio as 
Choreographic Thinking Tools. These are notebooks containing prompts and notational 
devices that dancers can complete in the studio to aid reflection and awareness of the mental 
strategies that they are using.  
Experiment 1: Experience sampling in the studio 
Experience sampling has a long and sometimes controversial history in psychology, but 
has recently seen a resurgence of popularity. Experience Sampling Methodology is a family 
of empirical methods that allow researchers to obtain measurements of an individual’s 
account of their internal mental events outside artificial laboratory settings and within the 
context of their normal everyday settings. In general, these methods involve interrupting an 
individual while they are going about an activity in its normal setting and asking them to 
make brief subjective reports about their current subjective state, via brief notes or rating 
scales.  By probing immediate self-report of inner experience, this method enables researchers 
to measure a person’s momentary thoughts, feelings and action-tendencies than by asking 
through more retrospective recall methods (for more detail see Feldman, Barrett & Barrett, 
2001; Myin-Germeys et al., 2009; Smyth et al., 2001; Stone & Shiffman, 1994). This 
approach was employed in this experiment to assess momentary internal experience of each 
of the imagery components of interest. 
The objective of our first experiment was to explore what contributed to dancers’ 
thought patterns while creating movement in response to tasks set them by McGregor, and 
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how changes in the nature of the task and the mode of creation affected these patterns of 
thought. We used two forms of task instruction, based on characteristic tasks that we had 
observed McGregor use previously. One task condition was based upon spatial-praxic 
imagery: one of the actual tasks used in this experiment was ‘Imagine an object. Reduce it to 
a line drawing. Visualise an element of it. Describe what is visible’. The other condition was 
based upon emotional instructions: one example from this experiment being ‘Think of a 
familiar song or piece of music. Focus on the memories, feelings or sensation it evokes, in 
you or someone else. Translate it into 3d and draw the meaning.’  
As its name implies, the spatial-praxic task might be expected to draw primarily upon 
imagining physical objects and actions in a spatial frame of reference. The emotional task, in 
contrast, might be expected to draw upon deeper and more elaborate conceptual and 
schematic knowledge including narrative and interpersonal elements that are rooted in 
meanings. This might include the connotations of movements and how another person might 
relate or react to them. Our expectation was that these two forms of task instruction would 
lead to systematic differences in the nature of the mental imagery reported by dancers. 
As an additional contrast, our experiential measures were collected from dancers 
completing choreography tasks in the studio in a conventional, physically active condition. 
However, as preparation for our second brain scanning experiment, where movement is not 
possible, we also employed a static condition, where dancers carried out the same kinds of 
tasks but simulated movement creation mentally rather than physically, while knowing that 
they would enact the movements at the end of the creation period.  These contrasts between 
active and static creation should enable us to detect any major differences in strategy that 
result. We also wanted to find out how these ratings collected during task execution compared 
with the dancers’ general prior beliefs about their ‘typical’ experience of movement creation 
and so a pre-test was included for one of our methods to enable us to assess this issue. 
Participants 
Eight professional members of Random Dance took part in the experiment (four male, 
four female; ages ranging from 24 to 32 years). The dancers had all been members of Random 
Dance for at least two years (one had been a member for three years and another for five 
years), and so were used to working together as a group under the direction of Wayne 
McGregor. They took part as a group, in a rehearsal space in London, with all instructions 
being given by Wayne McGregor. 
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Method 
Ethical approval for this experiment was granted by the University of Plymouth Faculty 
of Science. All participants gave written informed consent following a briefing session, in 
which they were given written and verbal information about the experiment. During this 
session, we explained to the dancers what we meant by mental imagery, and explained the 
idea that imagery could take different representational forms. We also explained that you 
could have several things going on in mind at once, but would be focally aware of just one 
form of representation at any one time, with others seeming to be in the background, ready for 
you to bring them into focal awareness. We were careful not to discuss any expectation that 
the tasks and modes of movement creation would change the forms of imagery that they used. 
Testing took place over two days. On the first day, dancers completed the Experience 
and Imagery Scales (EIS), and on the second, the Thought Monitoring exercises. The EIS is a 
conventional retrospective report, used here mainly over a short immediately preceding 
period, and was aimed at capturing an overall characterization of the dancers’ experience of 
creating movement and reflecting upon their beliefs about that experience looking back 
several minutes. The Thought Monitoring exercise attempts to capture more precisely the type 
of image in mind at any one moment in time.  At the end of the second day, dancers were 
debriefed and took part in a group discussion about their impressions of the experiment. 
On each day, the dancers completed four movement creation exercises each of 
approximately half-hour duration, two following spatial-praxic task instructions and two 
following emotional task instructions. Four dancers completed the spatial-praxic exercises 
first, and four the emotional, taking a twenty minute break between the pairs.  The first of 
each pair of exercises was made actively, with dancers moving around the space as they 
normally would when creating movement, but the second was static, with dancers mentally 
creating movement while lying still in a comfortable position on the floor, only enacting the 
movement at the end of the exercise (see Table 1 for a timeline of this experiment). 
The EIS were presented as a single A4 sheet containing 21 statements about different 
aspects of the dancers’ mental experience and imagery during movement creation, presented 
using visual analogue scales (See Appendix). The text for each statement was centred above a 
100mm line, and instructions at the top of the sheet asked dancers to make a mark anywhere 
on the line to indicate their experience, with textual anchors (such as ‘Never’ to ‘Most of the 
time’) being printed at either end of each line. On the front of the sheet, the first two items 
(labeled ‘stuff out there’) assessed whether dancers had been concentrating on events in the 
room rather than their own mental imagery, and if they had been distracted whether it was by 
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sounds or sights. The next nine statements on the first page all assessed the degree that 
dancers were aware of using different levels of mental representation, and short labels were 
printed to the left of items:  intuition (three items), body sensation, spatial-praxis, emotions, 
verbal thoughts, propositions, and limb/muscle urge. Another ten statements were printed on 
the other side of the sheet, and asked dancers to rate different aspects of their mental imagery. 
A free text box was included at the bottom of each side to allow dancers to note down 
anything else that they felt was important. 
Before the first exercise, dancers completed the EIS to reflect their beliefs about their 
general or typical experience of movement creation. McGregor himself then verbally gave 
each group of four dancers the instructions for their first active exercise and they began 
creating movement. After four minutes, they were asked to stop and to complete the scales, 
based upon the exercise so far. This served as a practice set. When they had completed the 
scales, they were asked to continue with the exercise. They completed four further sets of 
scales, cued at eight minute intervals by the experimenter. The same procedure was followed 
for the remaining three exercises, except that no practice set was given, and so only four sets 
of scales were completed in each of these exercises. For the static movement creation 
exercises, the dancers lay on the floor after the instructions had been given, and remained 
motionless while mentally creating, only moving to complete the scales when prompted. At 
the end of the static exercises, dancers were given five minutes to actively rehearse the piece 
they had constructed, and then performed it while being filmed. 
For each participant, the four sets of ratings collected during an exercise were used to 
obtain a mean rating for each of the 21 scale items for that exercise. 
On the second day, dancers completed a similar sequence of four exercises, again 
balancing order of spatial-praxic and emotional instructions. During these exercises they were 
asked to stop and write down what they had been thinking immediately before they had been 
stopped, using one or two words, such that they would be able to remember and describe it 
after the task: the purpose of this was to focus them upon the thoughts that were at the 
forefront of their mind, so that they could then classify the content of these thoughts using the 
same eight categories used as experiential labels on the EIS. These categorisations were the 
measure we sought for analysis; the actual notes were too fragmentary and idiosyncratic to 
support analysis by anyone other than the notemaker. 
During the first exercise, they were stopped eight times, at five minute intervals, with 
the first two stops serving as practice in recording their thoughts. During the other three 
exercises, they were stopped six times. As on day one, dancers rehearsed and performed their 
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pieces after each of the static exercises. 
Results 
Experience and Imagery Scales 
The mean ratings that dancers gave on the 21 EIS scales to describe their typical 
experience of movement creation varied between 30 and 77, with standard errors between 
between 4.1 and 12. Figure 1 shows these means, plus or minus one standard error, as wide 
grey bars. The spread of the error bar for each mean indicates the degree of consistency 
between dancers’ ratings: a small bar indicates similar ratings, while a large bar indicates a 
wide spread of ratings.  
The first two items indicated that dancers felt that they were not often influenced by 
events in their environment when creating movement (M = 30), but that when they were those 
events were just as likely to be sights as sounds (M = 43). Two-tailed one sample t tests 
showed that the first of these values differed from the midpoint of 50 (t(7) = 3.38, p = .012). 
but the second did not (t(7)=0.91, p=.394) - comparing the scale means against the midpoint 
allows us to infer whether the dancers were endorsing a statement (where M>50) or rejecting 
it (where M<50). A statement with a mean that is not statistically different to the midpoint is 
neither clearly endorsed, nor rejected. On this basis, their scores were around the midpoint 
when asked if  their movements were often intuitive (M = 46, t(7)=.038, p=.712), whether 
these intuitions were unguided or guided by a latent plan (M = 63, t(7)=1.04, p=.331) and 
were equally often emotional as not emotional (M = 53, t(7)=0.34, p=.742).   
Of the items addressing dancers’ mental focus while creating movement, the highest 
rating was given to spatial-praxis (M = 76, t(7)=6.2, p<.001), followed by limb/muscle 
(M = 68, t(7)=2.01, p=.084), propositions (M = 63, t(7)=1.29, p=.239), emotions (M = 62, 
t(7)1.18, p=.278), body sensation (M = 56, t(7)=.74, p=.484) and verbal thoughts (M = 55, 
t(7)=.42, p=.686). While all of these forms of representation received mean ratings above the 
midpoint, only the spatial-praxis measure was significantly different from the midpoint of the 
scale. 
The imagery items showed that dancers felt that the specific imagery that they created at 
the outset remained at the forefront of their minds while creating movement (M = 77, 
t(7) = 5.16, p = .001), and that this imagery guided their decision making (M = 66, t(7) = 2.95, 
p = .021) and senses of meaning linked to the imagery often came to mind (M = 65, 
t(7) = 1.98, p = .089).  They were equivocal about the ease with which they could reconstruct 
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their original imagery (M=37, t(7)=1.41, p=.201). 
When spatial-praxic imagery was involved it was highly vivid (M = 74, t(7) = 4.62, 
p = .002). Their decision making was not typically based upon what another person might 
think (M = 35, t(7) = 3.13, p = .017), nor on how good a movement felt without reference to 
other meanings (M = 30, t(7) = 3.05, p = .019). Dancers were equivocal about whether 
spatial-praxic imagery was of a third person view of themselves (M = 40, t(7)=1.32, p=.229), 
how familiar movements felt (M = 61, t(7)=1.78, p=.118), and how happy they felt with their 
decisions (M = 50, t(7)=.01, p=.989). 
The general pattern here is that dancers believe themselves to be creating movement 
intuitively to some intended plan of which they are not completely aware, using spatial-
praxic, limb/muscle and abstract propositional imagery based on an initial idea throughout the 
exercise, recruiting component movements with which they are familiar. Of course the 
dancers often differed substantially in their typical ratings and so these means are only 
indicative.  
Of further interest is how each dancer’s ratings differed when they were made in 
response to actual experiences during the four exercises. These means ratings are shown in 
Figure 1 as the circles (spatial-praxic task) and diamonds (emotional task), with filled 
symbols indicating the tasks competed while actively moving, and the empty symbols those 
completed mentally, while lying static on the floor. To see if the two tasks and modes of 
creation changed the ratings in different ways, we used SPSS 18 to carry out separate repeated 
measures ANOVAs for each scale with the within-subject factors of Task (spatialpraxic v. 
emotional) and Mode (static v. active). Statistically significant effects were found for eight of 
the scales, and (given the low power of the Experiment, with only eight dancers) non-
significant F values with effect sizes >.10 for another nine. The results of the ANOVAs are 
summarised in Table 2.  
The dancers were focused on mental imagery equally in all four tasks, with ratings very 
similar to their typical experience. When they were distracted, however, the effect of Mode 
that is listed in Table 2 shows that they were much more likely to be distracted by sounds than 
sights during the static exercise, when they were lying on the floor, with their eyes closed. 
This is not too surprising; but the effect of Task in Table 2 shows that they were also less 
distracted by sights during the emotional tasks (in Figure 1, the diamonds are lower than the 
circles). The absence of an interaction between Task and Mode shows that the effect of the 
emotional task was the same in both static and active modes. 
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The degree to which dancers felt they were moving intuitively was also affected by the 
task, with the emotional task being more intuitive than the spatial-praxic task. From the means 
in Figure 1, it would seem as if this effect is bigger for the active mode, but this interaction 
was not statistically significant. When they were moving intuitively, there were no differences 
in the ratings for whether the movement felt spontaneous or guided by some plan, but the 
movements felt more emotional in the active emotional task, and less emotional in the active 
spatial-praxic task – hence the significant interaction in Table 2.  
Turning to the dancers’ awareness of attending to each of the six levels of mental 
representation (body to limb/muscle), it is apparent that only one of the ratings lies above the 
dancers’ ratings of their typical experience. There were several noticeable effects of Task and 
Mode (indicated by the high values of partial eta-squared in Table 2, which estimates the 
proportion of variance in the data attributable to the effect), but due to the small number of 
dancers in the company, the low statistical power means that only one of these effects reaches 
statistical significance: the interaction of Task and Mode for the awareness of emotional 
experiences related to their movement. This indicates that when dancers were actively 
moving, the spatial-praxic task made them less aware of their emotional experiences; but 
when they were mentally creating movement while static, the emotional task made them less 
aware of emotional experiences. (This will be discussed further below.) 
Of the non-significant effects, the largest is the interaction of Task and Mode for 
awareness of spatial-praxic thought: ‘visual-like images in my mind’s eye.’ All four exercises 
produced ratings that were lower than dancers’ typical experience, but lowest was the active 
emotional task, followed by the static spatial-praxic task.. 
The dancers’ ratings for the use of imagery in their creative work and decision making 
showed that the static mode made it harder to bring to mind and reconstruct their original 
imagery while developing movements (this is the effect of Mode in Table 2; this scale ran 
from ‘very little effort’ at zero to ‘a great deal of effort’ at 100). 
Dancers based decisions about their movements upon their initial imagery more often 
during the spatial-praxic task than the emotional task. In the static mode, they were more 
likely to base decision upon how good a movement would feel for the spatial-praxic task, and 
less likely to do so for the emotional task, compared to active mode, where both tasks 
produced ratings similar to the typical experience. 
Finally, in response to the question ‘How many of your decisions are you happy with?, 
the dancers were clearly unhappier with decisions made in the unfamiliar static mode than 
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with the familiar active mode.  The fact that the dancers were not happy with how they 
responded to the tasks when asked to complete them without moving emphasizes that their 
normal method of movement creation involves a wide range of embodied activity that is not 
available when they are asked to lie motionless, as in neuroimaging studies. 
Thought Probes 
The six thoughts probed from the eight dancers during each of the four exercises on day 
two were pooled (a total of 186 thoughts, since six thoughts were uncategorized), the number 
allocated by the dancers to each category counted up, and divided by the total to give a 
proportion (Figure 2). Overall the highest proportion were verbal thoughts (22%), followed by 
bodily sensations (17%), spatial-praxic thoughts (16%) and thoughts about events happening 
in the rehearsal space (such as the music being played, other dancers’ proximity, or people 
walking around; 13%). These three categories together accounted for over two-thirds of 
thoughts (N = 127).  Dancers very rarely categorized their thoughts as ‘intuitive’, at only 6% 
(N = 12) overall. 
When the proportions of thoughts in each category reported for the four exercises are 
compared  (Figure 3), differences between the two modes of movement creation and the two 
tasks are apparent. For both tasks, the static mode resulted in a decrease in propositional 
conceptualization and bodily sensation; but while the spatial-praxic task led to fewer verbal 
thoughts and more emotional, spatial-praxic, and limb/muscle planning thoughts, the 
Emotional task showed the opposite pattern.  The emotional task also produced more thoughts 
about events in the external space in the static condition than the active. 
The small number of dancers, and the non-independence of the six thoughts per dancer, 
mean that there is no practical way of testing for statistical significance in these patterns of 
thought content, but the differences observed do make some intuitive sense. The static 
exercise does not offer much opportunity for the use of bodily sensations, and there is a clear 
shift away from abstract propositional conceptualisation. For the spatial-praxic task, there is a 
shift towards planning limb/muscle actions, with more spatial-praxic and emotional thoughts 
in the static than the active conditions. In the emotional task, however, there is less 
limb/muscle planning and more verbal thoughts, as well as a tendency to be distracted more 
by events happening in the studio in the static condition. 
Discussion 
The largest, and least surprising, difference between the experiential and the typical 
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ratings shown in Figure 1 is that dancers were less influenced by sights in the static exercises, 
when they were lying on the floor with their eyes closed, although the thought monitoring 
data shows that they were still distracted by events, especially during the emotional task. This 
is helpful in giving some face validity to the rating methodology. Dancers were also less 
happy about their decisions in the unfamiliar static condition. Beyond this, there are some 
interesting differences in the extent to which dancers feel that they are relying upon intuition, 
the role of emotional experience in their movement creation, and the reliance upon some form 
of imagery from the outset of each exercise. 
The active exercises were more like the dancers’ usual style of movement creation, and 
yet the filled symbols in Figure 1 show that their actual experience often differed from their 
expectations about what would be typical for them. In contrast to their typical ratings, they 
felt that they were making more use of intuition in the emotional task; for the active spatial-
praxic task they felt less aware of emotional experiences related to their movements and their 
intuitions were less emotional. This is unlikely to be a contrast effect from the emotional task, 
because of the counterbalancing: four dancers had not yet experienced the emotional task 
when rating the spatial-praxic task. Interestingly, in the thought probe data they also reported 
fewer emotional thoughts in the active than in the static mode.  
Compared to the rating scales, the thought monitoring data shows a different pattern for 
use of intuition, with thoughts rarely identified as intuitive. This may simply be because when 
asked about a thought at the moment it is happening, its precursors are more apparent, and so 
you are less likely to identify it as spontaneous. Similarly, while dancers used the rating scales 
to indicate that their typical experience would involve limb/muscle planning and few verbal 
thoughts, the thought monitoring showed verbal thoughts to be the most frequent category, 
with limb/muscle planning one of the rarer types: the dancers’ awareness was focused more 
than they anticipated upon conceptual than physical or bodily aspects. The thought 
monitoring and experiential results could differ for a number of reasons: the rating scales are 
obviously subjective and retrospective, whereas the thought monitoring attempts to 
objectively sample specific thoughts at a discrete moment. However, only six probes were 
possible in each of the four sessions, and so the granularity of the monitoring is large: it 
would be easy for thoughts of a specific form to have occurred briefly and not to have been 
caught by a probe. What the thought monitoring really gives us is an indication of the amount 
of time spent thinking in a particular way, rather than the importance of that form of thinking. 
It is more helpful to compare the two forms of measurement across the tasks and modes, than 
to compare them with each other within a task or mode. 
Points in Mental Space  17 
When dancers were asked to create movement mentally, without moving, there were 
clear differences in their experiential ratings. Compared to their typical ratings, they made 
less use of emotional experiences when they were completing the emotional task, and in both 
tasks they felt it harder to reconstruct their original imagery. In the more conventional active 
condition, they made less use of their imagery than typical in the emotional task, but more in 
the spatial-praxic task. Overall, compared to their typical ratings, dancers reported that they 
based their decisions about movement more often upon how good it felt as a part of a phrase.  
Importantly for the development of practical Choreographic Thinking Tools to support 
movement innovation, post-task debriefing also indicated that the very act of reflecting on, 
and categorizing, their experiences provided the dancers with insights about their mental 
habits during innovative movement creation. Such insights provide conditions under which 
habits can be recognised and then altered to adopt alternative points in mental space from 
which to create movement material. Providing the dancers and McGregor with a means to 
communicate more productively about the properties of the task-based instructions has been 
acknowledged by the company to be of clear benefit and a useful addition to their working 
process.  
Experiment 2: brain activity during choreographic thinking 
Mental Imagery has been extensively investigated both in cognitive and neuroscience 
laboratories (Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson, 2009) and in applied settings, for example to 
improve performance in competitive sports (Murphy, 1990). Studies of internal mental states 
such as imagery are controversial precisely because they have long been seen as subjective, 
and not open to objective quantification. Modern brain scanning techniques offer the prospect 
of providing collateral evidence for the involvement of different forms of imagery, since they 
enable us to test whether activity in function-specific brain regions known to be involved in, 
for example, visuo-spatial experiences, motor control or decision making is correlated with 
subjective reports of the use of that imagery. Owen & Coleman (2008), for example, used the 
detection of neural activity associated with different forms of imagined activity (playing 
tennis, or walking around one’s home) to show that a patient in a vegetative state, who could 
not respond physically, could respond mentally to oral instructions. Moreover, several studies 
have examined the brain activity of creative artists (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005; Berkowitz 
& Ansari, 2008), including studies of improvisation in dance (e.g. Fink, Graif & Neubauer, 
2009), and data obtained in this way offers the prospect of investigating the neural 
underpinnings of choreographic practice.  
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Cognitive neuroscience research has also investigated the neural mechanisms of motor 
imagery in the control of action (e.g. see deLange, Roelofs & Toni, 2008). In the same way 
that visual imagery and visual perception recruit similar brain regions (Ganis et al., 2004), 
several studies have shown that during imagination of a movement, the same sensorimotor 
regions are activated as when we observe a movement or actually execute it ourselves (Decety 
et al., 1994; Grèzes & Decety, 2001). Some studies have made use of the motor expertise 
model to investigate the link between the action execution and action perception network 
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Orgs et al., 2008) and motor learning 
(Cross et al. 2006).  Other studies have focused on the underlying neural mechanisms of 
creativity in realms other than dance (Jung et al., 2010), especially in music (Limb and Braun, 
2008) and drawing (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005). The bulk of these studies have been 
based upon the researchers’ expectations concerning motor responses, rather than seeking to 
correlate activity with subjective reports of motor imagery, so while they have focused upon 
motor or movement related brain processes, wide ranging networks are implicated and the 
possible involvement of multiple forms of imagery in such tasks remains to be clarified. 
To obtain evidence on the use of mental imagery in dance and creativity tasks, we set 
out to pilot with a single participant, the use of fMRI data to investigate the neural circuitry 
implicated in choreographing movement tasks. We have data from Experiment 1 indicating 
that changing the focus of the task from spatial-praxic to emotional representations changes 
the forms of imagery that dancers are aware of using in their movement creation. These 
changes do not always correspond with what one might expect if the changes were just due to 
demand effects, which would lead to the dancers reports reflecting their expectations about 
the needs of the tasks, and as with any self-report data, objective cross-validation would be 
helpful.  A single case-study is useful here to show that it is possible to identify different 
patterns of brain activity with tasks that require or involve different forms of mental imagery. 
If successful, this would support future work with larger numbers of volunteers to validate if 
there is a general pattern across individuals in different forms of imagery. 
In this pilot experiment, we again used spatial-praxic and emotional task instructions. 
As it is not possible to execute whole body movements in a brain scanner while recording the 
brain activity, we adapted the static mode from Experiment 1 for the neuroimaging session. 
For each task we used two phases: in a first phase our dancer was asked just to create imagery 
to meet the requirements of the instructions, without imagining movement; and in a second 
phase she was asked to create movement mentally, based upon that imagery. This approach 
enables us to identify any differences between two hypothetical aspects of choreographic 
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thinking: the creation of imagery used for choreography, and the mental movement creation.  
These two phases do not compare visual imagery with motor imagery, since each (along 
with other forms of imagery) may be involved in both phases; rather it is to discover which 
forms of imagery the dancer used in each phase. Of course, breaking the task down into these 
two phases makes it less like the dancer’s normal practice, in which imagery creation and 
movement creation are intertwined, and it may be difficult for a dancer to execute each phase 
separately: among other things, this pilot sought to show that an expert dancer could in fact 
meet these unusual task requirements. 
Method 
We used fMRI to record brain activity of a right handed female (age = 39), who was an 
experienced dancer with 12 years experience with the tasks used by Wayne McGregor | 
Random Dance. Ethical approval for this experiment was granted by Cambridge Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee.  
The scanning session included a block-design with three non-dance imagery reference 
tasks, and four dance-related experimental tasks (see Figure 4). We used the reference tasks to 
familiarise the dancer with the basic procedure (imagining playing tennis for motor imagery; 
imagining navigating around their home for spatial-praxic imagery, and a guided body scan 
for somatic imagery). The brain activations related to these tasks have been previously 
described (Boly, Coleman, Davis et al., 2007), therefore they are used as reference to identify 
brain regions related to motor and spatial imagery, and embodiment.  
As in Experiment 1, spatial-praxic and emotional task instructions were used, but they 
were now further divided into two phases: first an imagery creation phase, followed by a 
movement creation phase.  Two runs of the spatial-praxic tasks were conducted first, followed 
by two runs of the emotional tasks. Detailed task instructions concerning all tasks to be 
performed were given prior to entering the scanner, but to avoid the dancer creating imagery 
before scanning started, she was given six possible scenarios, and not told which to develop 
until scanning started. Since she was highly experienced, our instructions simply indicated the 
type and broad content of the task, leaving open those areas for task ambiguity and decision-
making described in the introduction. In the spatial-praxic tasks, the dancer was asked to 
‘Imagine an abstract 3D volume in space such as a cube - it might or might not have specific 
properties like texture’, and in the emotional tasks ‘the personal characteristics of someone 
you know or know about reasonably well; might be a friend, relative, colleague or a public 
figure and might relate to how they move; if they are old or young, how they interact with 
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others, express themselves emotionally.’ Each imagery and movement creation phase lasted 5 
minutes during which we alternated 30 seconds of the experimental task with 30 seconds of a 
control task (focusing on one’s own breath), with the beginning of each 30 second block 
indicated to the dancer by an appropriate verbal cue i.e., “3D volume” and “familiar person” 
for the imagery creation phases, “develop ideas” for the movement creation phases, and 
“focus on breathing” for the control task phases.   
The entire scanning session lasted 1.5 hours. Following the scanning itself the dancer 
was extensively questioned about the nature of imagery constructed as well as nature of the 
phrases developed. 
Data Acquisition and Image Analysis 
A 3T TIM Trio System (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) was used to acquire echo-planar 
functional images (TR=2.0 s, TE=30 ms, FA=78°, matrix size 64x64, 32 slices each with a 
25% gap, giving a voxel size of 3x3x3.75 mm, 11 sessions of 160 volumes). A T1-weighted 
MPRAGE anatomical volume used 1 mm3 voxels (flip angle=9°; TE=2.00 sec; GRAPPA 
acceleration factor = 2). Parameters were set to follow Boly et al. (2007) in order to be able to 
compare similarities in the reference non-dance tasks.    
Data were analysed using the SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first 10 
volumes in each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium. Standard spatial 
preprocessing comprised realignment to correct for head movement, rigid-body co-
registration with the dancer’s structural image, nonlinear normalization to the MNI T1-
weighted template (2-mm isotropic voxels), and finally, smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of 
8 mm FWHM. Raw images and the pattern of activation did not show artefacts that could be 
related to movement. For each session, events were modeled by convolving onset times with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF).  Contrasts for each experimental condition 
were computed using a General Linear model (GLM).  
The aim of the non-dance reference task was to familiarize the dancer with the 
procedure and to confirm that the dancer’s brain responses related to imagery. Our a priori 
anatomical hypothesis was based on previous studies using similar tasks. We used a 10-mm 
radius sphere small volume corrected (SVC) p<0.05 on previously documented coordinates 
from motor imagery and spatial navigation tasks (Boly et al., 2007).  For the dance tasks, we 
also used a small volume correction (with a sphere of 10mm radius) for areas in the action 
observation literature about which we had an a priori anatomical hypothesis. Significant 
activations outside predicted areas are reported at a corrected significance level of p< 0.05 
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after correcting for multiple comparisons over the whole brain to control the familywise error 
rate (FEW), with a cluster threshold of 20 voxels.  
Results 
On the basis of the post-scan debriefing we established the nature of the images 
generated in response to the spatial-praxic and emotional instructions and established some 
broad properties of how movement material that made up the phrases was created and 
developed. In both the imagery creation phases and static movement creation phases, quite 
varied and intricate strategies were involved, revealing a number of challenges both for 
analysis and interpretation. Our design involved two examples of both the spatial-praxic and 
emotional tasks and our dancer adopted different strategies for mentally creating movement 
material for the two examples: she imagined a huge intricate volume space and a simple 
cylinder in the two spatial-praxic tasks; in the two emotional tasks she used visual images of 
different personally significant people; and in the static movement creation phase she 
rehearsed the material she had created and then added new elements to the end of that 
sequence, rehearsed and added again and in this way accumulated material to form a practiced 
phrase. In one run of the emotional task she adopted a first-person perspective, and in the 
other run, a third-person perspective. For one run of the spatial-praxic task, she 
choreographed a solo, in the other run, a duet. This gross variation in cognitive activity 
between the two runs of each task means that it was not possible to contrast the spatial-praxic 
and emotional movement creation tasks directly. Our analysis therefore followed three major 
pathways.  
First, we analysed the three non-dance reference tasks to establish consistency with 
prior research on motor and spatial-praxic imagery (Boly et al., 2007). Second, we examined 
the pattern of activity involved in each imagery creation and static movement creation task 
compared to its concurrent control condition (breath focus), to illustrate the extensive brain 
networks involved in tasks such as this with intricate and varied demands, and also to allow 
for comparison with other fMRI work with dancers. Finally, we compared imagery creation 
with static movement creation tasks. 
Spatial navigation (navigating around one’s home) activated left pre-supplementary 
motor area (pre-SMA), supplementary motor area (SMA) and bilateral dorsal premotor cortex 
(dPMc), parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, occipito-parietal junction and 
precuneus.  Motor imagery (playing tennis) activated bilateral pre-SMA, SMA, dPMC, and 
inferior parietal lobe in the right hemisphere (see complete list of activations in Table S1, in 
the supplementary material). Somatic imagery (body scan) also revealed a clear signature of 
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activity in bilateral somatic areas along the post central gyrus, however, none of these 
activations survived corrections for multiple comparisons, and they will not be discussed 
further. These results were consistent with prior research (Boly et al., 2007), indicating that 
for this dancer different task instructions did indeed give rise to the expected patterns of 
differential activation of relevant brain regions. 
The spatial-praxis imagery creation task (compared to the control breath focus task) 
showed activations in a set of regions classically described in the action observation literature 
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). These are the ventral and dorsal sections of the premotor cortex, 
and the inferior and superior parietal lobe. There was also activation in the middle temporal 
gyrus, close to the extrastriate body area, and in the orbitofrontal cortex (Figure 5A). These 
latter activations were also present in the emotional imagery creation task, along with weaker 
activity in the left superior parietal lobe (Figure 5B; a full list of activations are reported in 
Tables S2 and S3 in the supplementary material). The emotional imagery creation was 
generally stronger in the left hemisphere, and lacked the motor/action areas apparent in the 
spatial-praxic imagery creation. 
For brain activity related to static movement creation we predicted a pattern of 
activation similar to that found in a previous study using whole body dance observation 
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). Accordingly, we performed a small volume correction (SVC) for 
multiple comparisons using 10mm spheres centred on these areas. We found bilateral 
activations in dorsal and ventral premotor cortex, superior parietal lobe, intraparietal sulcus 
and posterior superior temporal sulcus (Figure 6A). Finally, we found stronger activity in 
right inferior frontal gyrus during the two static movement creation tasks compared to the two 
imagery creation tasks (Figure 6B). No activations survived correction when conducting the 
opposite contrast (a full list of activations are reported in Table S4 in the supplementary 
material). 
Discussion  
This fMRI pilot investigation evaluated the relationship between neural activations and 
subjective reports obtained under similar conditions and assessed the feasibility of studying 
the neural underpinnings of choreographic practice.  These preliminary results are based on a 
single subject, therefore caution should be taken in interpreting and generalising the results.  
However, the study is based on a previous paradigm with well-established results that were 
replicated in several participants (Boly et al., 2007). In related paradigms single case studies 
have pinpointed issues that have proven to be highly significant, as in the report by Owen, 
Coleman, Boly, et al., (2006) of patterns of differential brain activation following requests to 
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imagine playing tennis or navigating around ones home in a single patient in a vegetative 
state. The outcome with our dancer confirms feasibility, but obviously broader extension to 
population characteristics for the neural underpinnings of these types of imagery would 
require follow-up work with group designs. As noted in the results section, our three non-
dance reference tasks supported the core validity of the overall fMRI procedure with respect 
to the involvement of different neural network components for different task instructions.  
Our fMRI data showed that the spatial-praxis and emotional imagery tasks shared 
activations in orbitofrontal cortex, middle temporal regions and occipital cortex. The 
orbitofrontal cortex has often been linked to sensory integration, in representing the affective 
value of reinforcers, and in decision-making and expectation (Kringelbach, 2005). Common 
brain activations in middle temporal regions may reflect perceptual expertise responses 
usually associated with the nearby extrastriate cortex. This region is thought to hold a human 
body representation (Downing et al., 2001) as well as a dynamic action representation 
(Downing et al., 2006) that may have contributed to both imagery creation and static 
movement creation. Spatial-praxis imagery creation showed additional activation in the 
premotor and parietal cortices suggesting that sensorimotor representations were being used, 
even though motor behaviour was not being explicitly imagined. Although based on a single 
dancer, our results are nonetheless in broad agreement with previous motor imagery studies 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Calvo-Merino et al., 2005).  
The activity related to static movement creation showed a very similar pattern of 
activity to the imagery creation tasks, showing how important imagery creation is in 
movement creation. Analysis of the peak coordinates indicated that brain regions participating 
here were the same as those in studies where expert dancers watch familiar dance movements 
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). The only major difference found between movement creation 
and imagery creation was an increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus, which has 
been associated with representations of goal directed actions in movement observation and 
execution (Iacoboni et al., 1999).  Moreover, this area has also been related to inhibition of 
prepotent responses (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts et al., 2009), but also in the multiple-
demand network (Duncan, 2010), which is activated by many different cognitive demands 
including perceptual difficulty, novelty, and response conflict. While it is possible that this 
activity reflects the novelty for our dancer of creating movement while remaining stationary, 
and having to inhibit her own movement, it could also reflect the need to synthesise different 
and novel ideas about movement to complete the movement creation task, as the subjective 
reports from Experiment 1 suggested. While these data do provide some general support for 
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the idea that both imagery and movement creation tasks are grounded in some elements of 
physical or action based thinking, they also raise some key questions concerning the wider 
mental context in which such thinking occurs and, given the clear limitations of the current 
fMRI and experience sampling work, how future research might usefully be directed. The 
variety of strategies adopted within each task by our very creative dancer, which prevented 
our direct comparison of spatial-praxic and emotional movement creation tasks, also shows 
that it is necessary either to impose clearer constraints upon the experimental tasks (e.g., to 
adopt a first-person perspective for one’s own dance, rather than a third-person perspective of 
other dancers), or if time and resources allow, to collect data from several runs in order to 
maximize task specific variations in relation to general variation in brain activity.  
An interesting illustration of how our findings might be further pursued concerns 
creativity. The neuroscience literature has given rise to considerable speculation concerning 
the role in creativity of the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral frontal areas implicated here in 
imagery and movement creation. For example, Jung et al. (2010) showed that cortical 
thickness in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex correlates with higher creative achievement, 
while Limb and Braun (2008) showed a deactivation of dorsolateral frontal regions during 
jazz improvisation. The latter finding highlights a potential contrast with our own data that 
might be pursued in further research. Our movement creation tasks, as evidenced by both the 
experience sampling and fMRI data, appear to have large decision-making components. In 
post-task debriefing our dancer noted that the movement creation phases involved attempting 
to remember the movement sequence. In contrast, perhaps jazz or movement improvisation 
may minimise demands on memory and decision-making. It would follow that a direct 
comparison of dance improvisation and phrase creation in the scanner should show 
differential activation of dorsolateral frontal cortex. Such a finding, if realised, would support 
task-dependent activation not unlike the task dependence evidenced in our earlier experience 
sampling study. Choreographic thinking will quite likely depend on a variety of neural 
components recruited in a task dependent manner and the exact nature of the dependence is, 
on the basis of this pilot work, clearly open to hypothesis development and direct test. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the two exploratory studies that we present here indicate that the neural 
and experiential attributes of imagery associated with movement creation are open to 
systematic investigation – movement creation can start from alternative points in mental space 
as well as physical space. This enables us to look forward to establishing with greater 
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precision how tasks that challenge dancers in different ways may affect mental and neural 
processes and how variation in imagery use across dancers might contribute to differences in 
the movement that they create. Notably, the act of reflecting on the experience of movement 
creation also offers some practical leverage to help dancers develop a wider range of 
strategies for innovation. The dancers in Experiment 1 initially gave high ratings for their use 
of intuitive feelings to guide their movement creation, but in practice were able to identify 
more specific content for their thoughts, indicating that their movement creation is a skilled 
and intentional activity in which they form an idea at the outset and attempt to base their 
movement upon this initial representation. Individual dancers varied in the forms of imagery 
that they reported: future studies could compare dancers’ preferred forms of imagery and 
standard measures of imagery vividness across a variety of forms of imagery (going beyond 
conventional measures of visual vs. motor imagery). 
The differences between static and active movement creation found in Experiment 1 
should make researchers cautious about drawing inferences from fMRI studies such as that 
reported in Experiment 2, because it is clear that choreographic movement creation is an 
embodied cognitive activity, in which the mind and body interact. Constraining the dancers to 
remain static changed the nature of their mental experiences and the content of their thoughts, 
making it harder for them to maintain a focus upon their original imagery and decreasing the 
amount of abstract propositional conceptualisation. The thought monitoring showed that the 
mental consequences of movement creation while static depended upon the task instructions 
the dancers were following (i.e., spatial-praxic or emotional) and so this also needs to be well 
defined. Nevertheless, the extensive recruitment of motor and decision making areas evident 
in the fMRI data encourages us to conclude that both approaches can yield valuable insights 
into the nature of creative choreography. Perhaps most importantly, our two studies 
emphasise the need for subjective as well as objective sources of evidence to be obtained, and 
for the need to consider the connections between subjective and objective measurement, as 
well as what any patterns that emerge from the comparisons might imply for choreographic 
practice. 
Soon after participating in the two exploratory studies, McGregor and the company 
spent three weeks in residence at the Experimental Media and Performing Arts Centre, Troy, 
NY and the Chicago Dance Center working on the Choreographic Thinking Tools with the 
same background theory (ICS, Barnard 1985; Barnard et al. 2007) and using revised 
experience sampling and thought probes as a reflective tool for the dancers. The residency 
resulted in a working process the dancers could use to enhance their use of imagery in 
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movement creation. The basics of this process involve a method of working with sources of 
inspiration or stimuli, extracting properties and strategies to translate these properties into 
movement material. What this does is free the individual dancer to make intuitive discoveries 
of novel movement material, and to be able to reflect on their process of movement creation. 
It also develops in trained dancers the ability to recognize ingrained movement patterns and to 
make unusual or perhaps even surprising choices in the creation process.  
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List of Tables: 
Table 1. Design of Experiment One. Dancers were divided into two groups to balance 
order of task instructions. Group A completed spatial-praxic tasks (S-P)  followed by 
emotional tasks (Emo);  Group B completed emotional followed by spatial-praxic tasks. EIS: 
Experience and Imagery Scales 
Table 2. Summary of ANOVA results from Experiment One. All effects where partial 
η2>.10 are listed; ns indicates p>.05. Partial η2 is a measure of effect size: Cohen (1988, 
p.283) suggests that .01 is a small effect, .06 a medium effect, and .14 a large effect. 
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Table 1 
Day One: EIS scales min measures A B 
Typical Ratings 10     
Active Task 36  Practice scales after 4 min 
EIS :12, 20, 28 and 36 mins 
S-P Emo 
Static Task 32  EIS : 8, 16, 24 and 32 min S-P Emo 
Rehearse Static piece 5     
Perform Static piece 5     
rest break 20     
Active Task  32  EIS : 8, 16, 24 and 32 min Emo S-P 
Static Task 32  EIS : 8, 16, 24 and 32 min Emo S-P 
Rehearse Static piece 5     
Perform Static piece 5     
Day Two: Thought Probes     
Active Task 40  Practice probes: 5, 10 mins 
Probes: 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 
40 min 
S-P Emo 
Static Task  30  Probes: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 
min 
S-P Emo 
Rehearse Static piece 5     
Perform Static piece 5     
rest break 20     
Active Task 30  Probes: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 
min 
Emo S-P 
Static Task  30  Probes: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 
min 
Emo S-P 
Rehearse Static piece 5     
Perform Static piece 5     
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Table 2 
 Task Mode Task x Mode 
Scale 
F 
(1,7) 
p; 
 partial η2 
F 
(1,7) 
p;  
partial η2 
F 
(1,7) p; partial η2 
Stuff out there --  --  --  
 — Sounds/sights 6.91 .034; .50 11.92 .011; .63 --  
Intuition 8.24 .024; .54 1.40 ns; .17 1.47 ns; .17 
— Spontaneous/guided --  --  1.86 ns; .22 
— Emotional/not emotional 5.65 .049; .45 --  10.18 .015; .59 
Body Sensation --  2.07 ns; .23 1.16 ns; .14 
Spatialpraxis --  --  2.76 ns; .28 
Emotions --  --  22.23 .002; .76 
Verbal thoughts --  --  --  
Propositions --  2.28 ns; .25 --  
Limb/Muscle Urge --  --  --  
Use of Imagery       
Imagery forefront --  --  1.42 ns; .17 
Reconstruct imagery --  6.42 .039; .48 1.06 ns; .34 
— Spatiopraxic vividness 1.20 ns; .15 --  1.42 ns; .17 
—Third person --  3.07 ns; .31 --  
Senses of meaning 2.90 ns; .29 --  1.11 ns; .14 
Familiar movement 4.21 ns; .38 --  1.25 ns; .30 
Decisions       
original imagery 7.53 .029; .52 --  1.50 ns; .26 
feel good 5.74 .048; .45 --  5.87 .046; .46 
other thinks --  --  --  
happy 1.86 ns; .21 9.25 .019; .57 2.63 ns; .27 
 
 
List of Figures: 
Figure 1: Mean ratings for dancers’ ‘typical experience’ of creating movement (grey 
bars, showing mean +/- one standard error), and their ratings while completing the four 
exercises (means and standard errors). Solid symbols indicate active tasks; empty symbols the 
static tasks; circles indicate spatial-praxic tasks and diamonds the emotional tasks. If a point is 
below the grey bar, then it is being experienced less than the dancers’ typical experience. If it 
is above the grey bar, then it is being experienced more than typical.   
Figure 2: Overall Proportion of thoughts probed by category. Verbal thoughts are most 
frequent; intuition, proposition, emotion and limb/muscle thoughts rarest. 
Figure 3: Compared to active movement creation (grey lines), in static movement 
creation (black lines), the spatial-praxic task (left diagram) showed fewer verbal thoughts, 
propositional conceptualisation and bodily sensations, and more spatial-praxic and emotional 
thoughts. The emotional task (right diagram) also showed less propositional 
conceptualisation, together with less limb/muscle planning, but more verbal thoughts and 
awareness of events in external space. 
Figure 4. Design of Experiment 2: For each of the three reference tasks, the dancer 
completed five 30s blocks of imagery creation, alternating with 30s of the control breath 
focus task. For the dance related tasks, the dancer completed five 30s blocks of imagery 
creation alternating with breath focus, followed by five 30s blocks of movement creation, also 
alternating with breath focus. 
Figure 5.  Brain rendering of areas that showed activity during (A) spatial praxis 
imagery creation and (B) emotional imagery creation, both relative to the control breath focus 
task.   (1a, 1b) bilateral premotor cortex, (2) superior parietal lobe, (3) middle temporal gyrus 
(4a, 4b) orbitofrontal cortex (p<.0.05, whole brain corrected. Projections of the activation foci 
on the surface of standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI).  
Figure 6: Brain rendering of areas that showed greater activity during static movement 
creation relative to (A) control breath focus task and (B) imagery creation task. (1a, 1b) 
bilateral premotor cortex, (2) superior parietal lobe, (3) middle temporal gyrus, (4) right 
inferior frontal gyrus.  (P<.0.05, whole brain corrected.  Projections of the activation foci on 
the surface of standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI).   
  
Figure 1: Mean ratings for dancers’ ‘typical experience’ of creating movement (grey bars, 
showing mean +/- one standard error), and their ratings while completing the four exercises 
(means and standard errors). Solid symbols indicate active tasks; empty symbols the static 
tasks; circles indicate spatial-praxic tasks and diamonds the emotional tasks. If a point is 
below the grey bar, then it is being experienced less than the dancers’ typical experience. If it 
is above the grey bar, then it is being experienced more than typical.  
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Figure 2: Overall Proportion of thoughts probed by category. Verbal thoughts are most 
frequent; intuition, proposition, emotion and limb/muscle thoughts rarest. 
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Figure 3: Compared to active movement creation (grey lines), in static movement 
creation (black lines), the spatial-praxic task (left diagram) showed fewer verbal thoughts, 
propositional conceptualisation and bodily sensations, and more spatial-praxic and emotional 
thoughts. The emotional task (right diagram) also showed less propositional 
conceptualisation, together with less limb/muscle planning, but more verbal thoughts and 
awareness of events in external space.
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Figure 4. Design of Experiment 2: For each of the three reference tasks, the dancer completed 
five 30s blocks of imagery creation, alternating with 30s of the control breath focus task. For 
the dance related tasks, the dancer completed five 30s blocks of imagery creation alternating 
with breath focus, followed by five 30s blocks of movement creation, also alternating with 
breath focus. 
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Figure 5.  Brain rendering of areas that showed activity during (A) spatial praxis 
imagery creation and (B) emotional imagery creation relative to the control breath focus task.   
(1a, 1b) bilateral premotor cortex, (2) superior parietal lobe, (3) middle temporal gyrus (4a, 
4b) orbitofrontal cortex (p<.0.05, whole brain corrected. Projections of the activation foci on 
the surface of standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI).  
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Figure 6: Brain rendering of areas that showed greater activity during static movement 
creation relative to (A) control breath focus task and (B) imagery creation task. (1a, 1b) 
bilateral premotor cortex, (2) superior parietal lobe, (3) middle temporal gyrus, (4) right 
inferior frontal gyrus.  (p<.0.05, whole brain corrected.  Projections of the activation foci on 
the surface of standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI).   
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List of Supplementary Material: 
Appendix A: the Experience and Imagery rating scales used in Experiment 1 
Appendix B: Brain Region activations from Experiment 2. 
Video Clips from Experiment 1: Extracts from the creative documentary "Wayne McGregor, 
going somewhere" by Catherine Maximoff, produced by lesfilmsduprésent – 2011. 
 
<http://www.lesfilmsdupresent.fr/2011/wayne-mcgregor-–-going-somewhere/> 
Clip 1 (maximoff clip 1 512.m4v) 
Wayne McGregor instructs the company with a spatialpraxic task which they then use to 
create movement in the static mode, while periodically being asked to complete the rating 
scales (7.2 Mb, 1m 40s). 
Clip 2 (maximoff clip 2 512.m4v) 
While actively creating movement, the dancers are asked to stop moving to complete some 
rating scales. The clip then shows them performing the pieces created. (8.3Mb, 1m 55s) 
Clip 3 (maximoff clip 3 512.m4v) 
In the debriefing session, the dancers explain how they felt about the day’s tasks (9.5 Mb 2m 
40s) 
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APPENDIX B 
Table S1: Areas predicted that survive p< 0.05 small volume correction using a 10mm sphere 
over coordinates from a previous study (Boly et al., 2007).  
Brain regions MNI coordinates Z -score 
 x y z  
Tennis > breath focus 
R Pre-SMA 12 4 56 5.19 
L Pre-SMA -18 0 64 >7.9 
R Dorsal premotor cortex 32 0 58 7.47 
L Dorsal premotor cortex -28 -2 56 5.65 
SMA 0 -10 58 4.35 
R Inferior parietal lobe 46 -36 38 4.10 
 
Spatial navigation > breath focus 
L Pre-SMA -4 16 42 6.02 
R Dorsal premotor cortex 20 0 56 >7.9 
L Dorsal premotor cortex -28 2 56 6.65 
R Parahippocampal cortex 32 -30 -32 4.35 
L Parahippocampal cortex -20 -38 -20 5.19 
R Retrosplenial cortex 12 -56 8 6.39 
L Retrosplenial cortex -6 -50 2 4.47 
R Occipito-parietal junction 22 -64 22 7.84 
L Occipito-parietal junction -26 -84 26 >7.9 
R Precuneus -24 -82 40 6.49 
L Precuneus 28 -78 44 >7.9 
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Table S2: Brain responses significantly stronger during spatial-praxis imagery creation.  
These activations survived corrections for multiple comparison across the whole brain at p < 
0.05. L/R: left and right hemispheres. Only activations in excess of 20 voxels are listed. 
Brain regions MNI coordinates Z -score 
 x Y z  
Spatial-praxis imagery > breath focus 
R Superior parietal lobe 20 -66 62 >7.9 
L Precuneus -18 -68 62 >7.9 
R Inferior temporal gyrus 56 -70 -8 >7.9 
L Precentral gyrus -30 -44 58 >7.9 
R Middle temporal gyrus 70 -40 -8 7.51 
R Superior frontal gyrus 28 -2 60 7.39 
L Middle temporal gyrus -54 -62 -2 7.23 
L Precental gyrus  -54 10 30 6.58 
L Superior frontal gyrus -22 -4 58 6.71 
L Middle Occipital gyrus -30 -88 30 6.69 
R Precentral gyrus 52 8 36 6.57 
R Superior medial gyrus 14 48 4 6.48 
R Postcentral gyrus 68 -10 20 6.16 
L Inferior temporal gyrus 68 -28 22 6.12 
L Middle temporal gyrus -68 -22 -2 5.79 
L Cerebelum -36 -40 -40 5.59 
R superior temporal gyrus 56 -22 10 5.48 
Middle cingulate  12 16 44 5.37 
R Supramarginal gyrus 56 -18 26 5.28 
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Table S3:  Brain responses significantly stronger during emotional imagery creation. These 
activations survived corrections for multiple comparison across the whole brain at p < 0.05. 
L/R: left and right hemispheres. Only activations in excess of 20 voxels are listed.     
Brain regions MNI coordinates Z -score 
 X y z  
Emotional narrative > rest 
R Superior parietal lobe 18 -68 66 >7.9 
L Mid orbital gyrus -6 60 -4 7.84 
L Middle orbital gyrus -22 42 -16 7.02 
R Middle temporal gyrus 54 -30 -10 6.98 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 58 36 12 6.28 
L Precuneus -10 -66 70 6.08 
L Fusiform gyrus -44 -42 -20 6.06 
L SMA -4 14 62 6.01 
L Temporal pole -48 18 -20 5.67 
L Middle temporal gyrus -62 -36 -6 5.63 
R Postcentral gyrus 68 -4 26 5.61 
R Middle cingulate 12 20 38 5.47 
R Precuneus 20 -60 24 5.42 
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Table S4:  Areas that survive p< 0.05 small volume correction using a 10mm sphere over 
coordinates from a previous study using observation of whole body dance movements (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2005).  For non-predicted areas, only activations in excess of 20 voxels are 
listed in this section of the table.  L/R: left and right hemispheres.   
Brain regions MNI coordinates Z -score 
 x y z  
Movement creation > breath focus 
Predicted areas (SVC) 
L Superior precentral gyrus -24 2 64 >7.9 
R Superior precentral gyrus 30 0 62 >7.9 
R Superior parietal lobe 16 -66 62 >7.9 
L Superior parietal lobe -14 -68 64 >7.9 
R superior parietal lobe/ intraparietal 
sulcus 
-32 -44 58 >7.9 
Intraparietal sulcus/ Postcentral sulcus 36 -42 46 >7.9 
L Precentral gyrus -54 8 40 >7.9 
R Precentral gyrus 54 14 38 6.88 
L posterior superior temporal sulcus -42 -74 36 5.56 
 
Non predicted areas (corrected  P < 0.05) 
L SMA -2 18 50 5.92 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 50 20 26 6.00 
R Caudate nucleus 20 8 14 5.08 
R superior occipital gyrus 18 -102 14 5.75 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 48 34 10 5.71 
L Insula lobe -32 22 6 5.59 
R Middle temporal gyrus 58 -60 2 7.19 
L Putamen -24 6 2 5.83 
R Superior media gyrus 12 62 0 6.48 
L Middle temporal gyrus -54 -62 0 6.80 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 30 32 -10 5.76 
R Superior temporal gyrus 62 -8 -10 5.32 
L Middle orbital gyrus -22 40 -16 6.99 
R Inferior temporal gyrus 62 -34 -20 6.50 
R Temporal pole 42 24 -20 5.58 
 47 
 
